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PERSONAL PROPERTY AND SALES
F. HODGE O'NEAL* and THOMAS G. ROADY, JR.**
SALES

Two sales cases were decided during the survey period. One of the
cases, Henson v. Wright,' was an action by the buyer of a tractor to
rescind the purchase for breach of warranty. Complainant in that
case inquired of defendant, an automobile dealer, about the purchase
of a second hand tractor suitable for working a truck garden. Defendant, who was not a regular tractor dealer, told complainant that he
thought he knew where he could procure a tractor for complainant.
Some time thereafter complainant, defendant, and one of defendant's
mechanics went to the home of a Mr. Johnson (who was away at the
time) to look at a tractor that Johnson had, and complainant agreed to
buy it. While being delivered to complainant's home, the tractor, broke
down and defendant had it taken to his place of business for repair.
Later, after delivery to complainant, it broke down again and proved
incapable of doing complainant's work. In the suit to rescind, defendant contended (1) that he did not sell the tractor to complainant but
merely acted as a go-between and accommodated complainant by getting the transaction financed at the bank, and (2) that he did not make
any warranty of any kind as to the fitness or usefulness of the tractor.
On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed the chancellor's decree. In
support of the chancellor's finding that there was privity of contract
between defendant and complainant and that defendant and not Johnson sold the tractor to complainant, the court pointed out the following:
the note which complainant gave in connection with the transaction
was made payable to defendant, not to Johnson; Johnson was nowhere mentioned as seller in the transaction; the record did not show
how much defendant paid Johnson for the tractor or how much profit
defendant received; there were never any negotiations between complainant and Johnson; and Johnson testified he sold the tractor to
defendant. In sustaining the chancellor's finding that defendant made
an express warranty as to the fitness of the tractor, the court commented that "the actions of the defendant immediately after the sale
and purchase of the tractor tip the scales in favor of the complainant's
contention. When the tractor broke down and quit running while
being driven to complainant's home, the defendant sent for and had
* Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University; member, Louisiana and Georgia
Bars.
** Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University; member, Tennessee and Illinois Bars.
1. 296 S.W.2d 367 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1955).
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the tractor towed to his garage and made repairs thereon, and then
later, upon complaint by complainant either in person or through
mechanic, made two trips to complainant's home for adjustments to
the tractor before he, in vexation, announced to the complainant's
wife that he would make no further repairs on the tractor." 2
Judd v. Fruehauf Trailer Co.3 is a questionable decision which perhaps opens a way for a seller in a conditional sale contract to circumvent provisions of the conditional sales act designed to protect the
conditional buyer. The statutory provisions involved in that case state
that whenever a conditional seller regains possession of property sold
because the consideration remains unpaid at maturity, he shall within
ten days after regaining possession advertise the property for sale for
4
cash to the highest bidder by posters posted in specified public places,
and that if the seller fails to do so, the conditional buyer may recover
from the conditional seller that part of the consideration which has
been paid to the seller. 5 In the Judd case, defendant sold plaintiff a
trailer. When plaintiff fell behind in his payments, defendant directed
plaintiff to bring the trailer and leave it on defendant's lot while plaintiff attempted to make arrangements for refinancing or for bringing
the payments up to date. Plaintiff eventually brought suit under the
statutes mentioned above to recover the amount that he had paid
on the purchase price of the trailer, insisting that all negotiations for
refinancing the trailer had ended not later than February and that
defendant had not begun to advertise the trailer for sale until the latter
part of May. The circuit court dismissed the suit, and on appeal the
judgment was affirmed. The court of appeals stated that the record
clearly showed that neither plaintiff nor defendant considered that
placing the trailer on defendant's lot was for the purpose of immediately enforcing defendant's claim for the balance of the purchase
money; that the trailer was placed there pending negotiations for refinancing; that even though active negotiation for refinancing were
not carried on after the middle of February, nevertheless defendant
was "indulging" plaintiff with the hope that he would catch up the
delinquent installments or refinance the purchase and thus save the
money he had already put into the trailer; and that defendant was not
in any way trying to impose on plaintiff or take advantage of him. The
court concluded that, as the statutory provisions were passed for the
protection of the buyer of goods, defendant could not in equity and
good conscience be penalized for undertaking to afford plaintiff even
more protection than the law required.
2. Id. at 371.

3. 293 S.W.2d 591 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1956).
4. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-1302 (1956).
5. TENN. CODE ANN.§ 47-1306 (1956).
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Liability of Common Carrier: Is a carrier liable to a shipper for
breach of contract for failure to deliver an animal lost en route from
point of shipment to point of delivery? This question was considered
by the Western Section of the Court of Appeals during the survey
period in Frye v. Railway Express Agency, Inc. 6 In this case the Court
decided that the evidence presented a question for the jury. as to
whether the carrier's employees were negligent in not preventing the
animal (dog) from escaping.
Since a very early date the general rule has been that a common
carrier is an insurer of goods entrusted to his care, liable for their loss
or damage at all events. 7 With the passage of time certain exceptions
to this rule of absolute liability were developed until at the present
time the following exceptions are generally recognized, viz., (1) act
of God, (2) act of the public enemy, (3) act of the state, (4) act of the
shipper, and (5) damages due to the inherent nature of the goods
themselves. 8
In addition to these exceptions, common carriers have succeeded in
limiting the rigorous nature of the liability imposed upon them by the
common law by the use of contracts with the shipper. Though common
carriers may be somewhat more circumscribed in their. freedom to
contract with a view to limiting their liability than is an ordinary
bailee, it is generally accepted that they may by contract place suitable restrictions and limitations on their common-law liability for loss
of the shipped goods. 9
In the Frye case the shipment of the dog was made under a special
livestock contract. The validity of this contract was not in dispute.
By its terms the shipper agreed to assume many of the risks for loss
of or damage to the animal that absent such agreement the carrier
would have had to bear. The general nature of this contract is to limit
the liability of the carrier to injury or loss caused by the carrier or by
the negligence of its agents or employees and it attempts to place the
burden of proving the negligent loss by the carrier on the shipper.10
Absent such a contractual undertaking the carrier is generally presumed to be liable and the burden of proving that the loss is due to an
excepted cause is on the carrier.1 1
But just what significance did the court attribute to the clause in the
6. 296 S.W.2d 362 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1955).

7. Coggs v. Bernard, 3 Salk. 268, 91 Eng. Rep. 817 (K.B. 1703).

8. See BROWN, PERSONAL PROPERTY 423-48 (2d ed. 1955).

9. Id. at 470.
10. Id. at 425.
11. Such a provision was present in the case at hand. "Section 8, The Shipper agrees that as a condition precedent to recovering hereunder for loss or
injury or damage to or delay in delivery of this shipment, such loss, injury,
damage or delay shall be proved by the Shipper to have been caused by the
negligence of the Carrier...." 296 S.W.2d at 365.
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contract placing the burden of proving negligence of the carrier on
the shipper? The case is not entirely clear on this-point. Quoting from
a prior Tennessee decision 2 the court stated: "The mere factum of the
loss or damage does not fix absolutely the liability of the carrier but
simply operates to impose upon it the necessity of showing that the
loss.or damage did not result from its negligence ....-"13 Yet the court
recognized 4 that a carrier may "exonerate itself from responsibility
by.either showing that the case falls within one of the exceptions of
the common law, or within one of the stipulations of the special contract."'15 And the ultimate question was stated in terms of whether or
not there was any material evidence upon which the jury could have
found the defendant guilty of proximate negligence and therefore
liable to the plaintiff for the loss of the dog. The court concluded that
there was such evidence and that the action of the circuit judge who
set aside a verdict in favor of the shipper and directed a verdict for
the carrier was in error.
Pledges: In First Nat'l Bank v. Ivie 1 the Eastern Section of the
Court of Appeals had occasion to consider the duties and obligations of
a pledgee of certain promissory notes. A pledge is a bailment of personal property to secure an obligation of the bailor17 In this case Ivie
had endorsed and delivered a number of promissory notes in which he
was named as payee to Judge Dannel for the purpose, among other
things, to hold the balance of these notes "'as collateral or as security
for the payment of the balance due' "18 a certain creditor. The amount
due and owing such creditor was apparently in dispute. The pledgee
sold the notes to the bank and used the money obtained therefrom to
discharge the claims of pledgor's creditors. Since the court could find
no authority for such an act it concluded that this amounted to a
conversion even though the pledgor might eventually be unable to
establish any damage from the sale.19
The court cited ample authority for the proposition that
the violation by the pledgee of any condition under which the pledged property
is received by him is a conversion of the property. While as a general
rule a pledgee can legally sell the pledged property after default by
the pledgor on the principal obligation if he proceeds in a proper manner, it is generally true that where the articles of pledge are choses
in action (promissory notes, bills of exchange, etc.) they cannot be
12. Illinois Cent. Ry. v. H. Rouw & Co., 25 Tenn. App. 475, 159 S.W.2d 839,
841 (W.S. 1940).
13. 296 S.W.2d at 365.
14. bid.
15. Louisville & N. Ry. v. Wynn, 88 Tenn. 320, 14 S.W. 311 (1890).
16. 293 S.W.2d 34 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1955).
17. 'RVTATE1VENT, SECURnTY § 1 (1941).
18. 293 S.W.2d at 39.
19. Ibid.
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sold absent an agreement between pledgee and pledgor permitting
such sale. An unauthorized sale by the pledgee of this type of security
constitutes a conversion of the property and the pledgee is liable in
damages for the reasonable value of the property disposed of.20 Where
such is the nature of the pledged property and there is no agreement
for sale, the pledgee upon default can enforce his security only by
collecting from the obligor of the pledged close.
Gifts: There were two significant developments affecting the law of
gifts during the survey period. The first of these was a decision by
the Western Section of the Court of Appeals 2' in which there is an
extensive discussion of the law in this jurisdiction bearing on gifts of
personal property. The fact situation presented a question never before directly considered by a Tennessee court and the court resolved
the question by holding that there was a good inter vivos gift of
decedent's account in a savings and loan association where he had
executed an assignment in the pass book, placed it and a letter explaining the assignment in a sealed and stamped envelope properly
addressed to assignee, and then deposited in a rural mail box where
it was subsequently picked up by the mail carrier. The difficulty the
court faced arose from the fact that donor was contemplating suicide
when he made the gift and committed suicide before the pass book
was in the hands of the donee. This case is fully discussed elsewhere
in this survey2 2 and no further treatment is justified here, other than
to say that the result reached appears to be a sound one although it
is difficult to understand just why the court spent so much time in
justifying its classification of the gift involved as inter vivos rather
than causa mortis. It is submitted that the result should be the same
even if the conclusion is that the gift was causa mortis. 23
The second significant development was legislative in character. The
Eightieth General Assembly passed and the Governor signed the
"Uniform Gifts to Minors Act" which became effective March 7, 1957.24
This Uniform Act has now been adopted in some fourteen states and
25
has been made applicable by Congress to the District of Columbia.
The Uniform Gift to Minors Act was approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1956. It was based
upon a model act drafted and sponsored by the New York Stock Exchange and the Association of Stock Exchange Firms. In the Com20. BROWN, PERSONAL PROPERTY 670 (2d ed. 1955).

21. Ray v. Leader Federal Say. & Loan Ass'n, 292 S.W.2d 458 (Tenn. App.
W.S. 1953).
22. Hartman, Contracts-1957 Tennessee Survey, 10 VAND. L. REv. 1013, 1026
(1957).
23. See BRowN, PERSONAL PROPERTY 151 (2d ed. 1955).
24. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1957, c. 112, TENN. CoDE ANN.
1957).
25. 9A UNioimw LAWS ANN. 32 (Supp. 1957).

§§ 35-801 to -810 (Supp.
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missioner's prefatory note the following statements appear.26
The Model Act provides a simple, inexpensive method for making
gifts of securities to minors, for accomplishing what could previously
be done under a trust instrument.
A direct gift of securities to a minor involves serious practical difficulties, particularly upon the sale of the security during minority.
The minor may disaffirm the sale; hence, brokers, issuers and transfer
agents deal with a minor at their peril.
A formal guardianship provides no adequate substitute. The guardian may be liable for losses if a "non-legal" security is retained. Generally he cannot reinvest except in "legals." Generally also he is required to furnish a bond and to make frequent expensive formal accountings.
The net result is to discourage, if not prevent, small gifts of securities
to minors. Statutes or regulations eliminate those complications when
the subject of the gift is a United States Savings Bond or, in many
states, money deposited in a banking institution. The Model Act seeks
a similar result when the subject of the gift is a security.
The theory underlying the Model Act is simple. A donor who gives
a security to a minor in the manner prescribed by the Act thereby
makes a gift which vests indefeasibly in the minor (and qualifies for

the $3000/$6000 gift tax exclusion provided for in Internal Revenue
Code Section 2503) and, in addition subjects the gift to the prescribed
administrative powers, rights, duties and immunities of the custodian
named by the donor and third person dealing with the custodian.
The Uniform Act broadens the Model Act to permit gifts of money
for investment under the "prudent man" rule prescribed in the act.

It would be well for lawyers to study this legislation in order to
27
advise clients who contemplate gifts of money or securities to minors.
26. Ibid.

27. 1956 INT. REv. BULL. No. 11, at 11; 2 CCH FED. EST. & GIFT TAX REP.
8066 (Jan. 6, 1956); MacNeill, Giving to Minors Made Easy-In Eight States,
TRUST BULL. Nov. 1955 p. 28. See Moore, Uniform Gifts of Securities to Minors
Act: A Considerationof Its Merits, 33 U. DET. L. J. 298 (1956); Notes, 69 HARV.
L. Rv. 1476 (1956); 54 MicH. L. REV. 883 (1956).

